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Abstract
Background: Negative news media reports regarding potential health hazards of implanted medical devices and
pharmaceuticals can lead to a ‘negative halo effect,’ a phenomenon whereby judgments about a product or product
type can be unconsciously altered even though the scientific support is tenuous. To determine how a ‘negative halo
effect’ may impact the rates of use and/or explantation of medical products, we analyzed the occurrence of such an
effect on three implanted medical devices and one drug: 1) intrauterine contraceptive devices (IUDs); 2) silicone
gel-filled breast implants (SGBI); 3) metal-on-metal hip implants (MoM); and 4) the drug Tysabri.
Methods: Data on IUD use from 1965 to 2008 were gathered from the Department of Health and Human Services
Vital and Health Statistics and peer-reviewed publications. Data regarding SGBI implant and explantation rates from
1989 to 2012 were obtained from the Institute of Medicine and the American Society of Plastic Surgeons. MoM implant
and explantation data were extracted from the England and Wales National Joint Registry and peer-reviewed
publications. Tysabri patient data were reported by Elan Corporation or Biogen Idec Inc. Data trends for all
products were compared with historical recall or withdrawal events and discussed in the context of public
perceptions following such events.
Results: We found that common factors altered public risk perceptions and patterns of continued use. First,
a negative halo effect may be driven by continuing patient anxiety despite positive clinical outcomes. Second,
negative reports about one product can spill over to affect the use of dissimilar products in the same category. Third,
a negative halo effect on an entire category of medical devices can be sustained regardless of the scientific findings
pertaining to safety. Fourth, recovery of a product’s safety reputation and prevalent use may take decades in the U.S.,
even while these products may exhibit widespread use and good safety records in other countries.
Conclusions: We conclude that the ‘negative halo effect’ associated with a stigma, rather than an objective risk-benefit
assessment of medical products can increase negative health outcomes for patients due to reduced or inappropriate
product usage.
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Background
When an implanted medical device or drug is withdrawn
or recalled, or when negative press reports raise signifi-
cant concerns about the health risk of that device or
drug, multiple impacts, such as market value reductions
and reputational declines to a product, brand or manu-
facturer, may reasonably be expected. For example, at
the market level, a broader than expected sell-off of
stocks following negative news about a drug or device
could be due to the expected loss of revenue, increased
manufacturer costs due to litigation or marketing, or an
expectation of increased regulation or approval delays.
Market level reductions may reflect actual or anticipated
changes in patient or consumer attitudes, beliefs, and
behavior. At the individual consumer or patient psycho-
logical level, for example, perceptions can be influenced
by the “halo” effect, a classic finding in psychology
wherein a smiling or attractive person is judged to be
more honest (positive “halo”), and a non-smiling or un-
attractive person is judged to be dishonest (negative
“halo”) [1]. In general, halo effects are unconscious, are
developed on the basis of casual experience rather than
through a reasoned process, and lead to unsound judg-
ments [1, 2]. Positive and negative halo effects have been
observed in consumer behavior. For example, a product
labeled as “organic” may be perceived as higher in fiber
and lower in calories or lower in fat (positive halo) [3]
and less enjoyable (negative halo) [4]. In the aftermath
of negative press reports on medical device or drug
withdrawals, individual consumers are subject to such a
“negative halo” effect, by which a drug, device, product
or product type is then viewed in a negative light across
a variety of contexts, only some of which may have been
implicated in the recall or withdrawal.
Multiple factors can contribute to the emergence of a
negative halo effect, including uncertain scientific findings,
negative press reports, and voluntary removal or regula-
tory restrictions on use of an implant or product. Un-
sound judgments are bolstered when uncertain scientific
findings are taken out of context and/or poorly explained
by the news media. Negative press reports about device
problems, for example, can create a social context in
which fears may become established and flourish [5] and
contribute to heightened vigilance of subjective symptoms
among some product users or existing implant patients,
resulting in a rapid decrease of use or an increase in re-
ported device failures and explantation (removal) proce-
dures. Thus, at the individual consumer level, uncertainty
about potentially negative scientific findings or the reasons
for a withdrawal, which is fueled by negative media, may
result in sales declines for a specific product or a group of
products perceived to be similar.
Product-specific recalls and negative reports some-
times result in consumer rejection of an entire class of
drugs or implant devices. In the case of heavily publi-
cized events in a drug or device marketplace, a damaged
reputation or negative halo of one product can affect all
associated products, even if those products were not
directly implicated in the original recall or withdrawal
event. This phenomenon is considered a “spillover
effect.” Spillover effects can be positive (e.g., when com-
petitor products benefit during a recall) or negative (e.g.,
non-recalled products see declines in sales due to over-
generalized concerns) [6]. Negative spillover phenomena
are another kind of overgeneralization in which non-
implicated products or manufacturers are affected simi-
larly to the directly implicated products [6]. Negative
spillover effects can be quite significant, and may even
outweigh the benefits that would normally accrue to
“surviving” products in the market [6]. Spillover effects
may be attributed to psychological or consumer level
factors, such as a limited public understanding of func-
tional, clinical, and/or chemical similarity or differences
between the recalled drug or device and other products.
Positive and negative spillover effects from one product,
class of products, or from one manufacturer to another
have been observed with many product recalls and with-
drawals, including prescription drug withdrawals [6], toy
recalls in 2007 [7], and hormone replacement therapy [8].
Positive and negative halo and spillover effects are
examples of overgeneralizations. In the case of halo
effects, the overgeneralization is from one attribute of
a product to other attributes of that same product. In
the case of spillover effects, the overgeneralization is
from one product to a group of products perceived to
be similar (from a lay perspective). In principle,
generalization within a class is reasonable and ordin-
ary; however, overgeneralization, when driven by a
poor understanding of the scientific evidence or by ir-
rational causes such as fear, may result in unintended
negative health effects.
One notable example of a spillover effect with negative
consequences involved Vioxx. Early in 2004, Vioxx,
manufactured by Merck, was a widely used non-
steroidal anti-inflammatory drug with annual sales ap-
proaching $2.5 billion. In September, 2004, Vioxx was
withdrawn because of a reported association with in-
creased heart attack risk [9]. News about patient deaths
was widely publicized, and significant litigation involving
Merck ensued, resulting in negative impacts to Merck’s
market value [10]. The resulting investigations also led
to enhanced warnings on related drugs. Collins et al.
[11] reviewed state-level prescription data before, during,
and after the Vioxx withdrawal. They reported both
positive and negative spillover effects. Patients switched
en masse from Vioxx to similar competitive products,
non-similar alternative medications, or to no treat-
ment at all, for example. Additionally, a decline
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occurred in aggregate consumption of non-steroidal
anti-inflammatory drugs [11].
Collins et al. [11] argued that this generally rational re-
sponse to a real or perceived risk may have had inadvert-
ent negative health impacts from a broader public health
and well-being perspective. Patient-selected alternatives
to Vioxx included over-the-counter analgesics that may
not have been the most effective or appropriate alterna-
tives for their condition. Patients who opted to forego
medication may have overgeneralized the negative news
about Vioxx towards all unrelated non-steroidal anti-
inflammatory drugs, and, by going untreated, these pa-
tients likely would have experienced worsening health
and/or quality of life. Thus, while some patients reduced
their exposure to Vioxx-related heart attack risk, the net
health and wellness benefit of patient responses in the
aggregate was unclear [11]. Excessively broad generaliza-
tions of negative news may increase health risk or limit
patients’ quality of life (e.g., patients exposing themselves
to additional risks through unwarranted explantation
surgery, curtailing their purchases of non-recalled pain
medications [11], or reducing their preventative health
care visits in response to hormone-replacement-therapy
warnings [8]).
Patients or end-user consumers are not the only af-
fected persons. Perpetuation of the stigma in the media
can influence doctors to offer alternative drugs and med-
ical devices and/or influence patients to choose other
medical options, even though these options may be less
effective, or may pose significant avoidable health risks.
During and after a device recall, some patients are more
prone to serious worry about their health status; they
may even express their anxiety through litigation and/or
selective pursuit of medical providers who can substanti-
ate their fears as a secondary gain [12]. Patient fear may
lead doctors to more readily declare device failures, and
support patient decisions for explantation based on pa-
tient fears in the absence of other implant-related health
problems. In essence, anxiety generated by news media
and/or uncertain scientific reports (even if not well sup-
ported by science or the patient’s clinical status) can be-
come in and of itself a valid medical rationale for
implant removal in patients with no clinically apparent
failure and no definite implant-related injury or disease.
Underlying these behaviors are judgments that are un-
conscious and resistant to reasoning, new facts, or safety
data [1]. Consequently, those stigmatized impressions
may persist long after products have been withdrawn or
removed from the market, despite the emergence of
safety data to the contrary.
Overgeneralizations, such as halo and spillover effects
have the potential to more broadly affect public health.
They impact the behavior of consumers, patients, and
physicians by limiting the use of potentially more
efficacious therapies, and by shifting and altering public
policy regarding product regulation. The purpose of this
study is to explore these effects. Specifically, we review
some over-generalization effects of negative information
related to selected medical implant devices and one drug
between the 1970s and today, including: 1) intrauterine
device contraceptives (IUDs); 2) silicone gel-filled breast
implants (SGBI); 3) metal-on-metal hip implants
(MoM); and 4) Tysabri (natalizumab), a drug for treating
Multiple Sclerosis and Crohn’s Disease. The circum-
stances associated with the stigma and its influence on
drug usage and explantation of each device are exam-
ined. The impact on public health and the role that
each case played in altering public policy are also ex-
plored. Recommendations for risk communication to
reinforce safe and effective treatments, minimize ad-
verse clinical outcomes, and reduce unintended social
impacts are suggested.
Methods
The medical products included in our analysis were se-
lected based on an initial review of historical drug and
device recalls and/or market withdrawal decisions sub-
mitted to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). Searches were conducted of scientific literature
as well as government documents and medical associa-
tions for data sources providing insights on the timing
and magnitude of impacts of these recall or withdrawal
decisions on sales and/or implant removal or replace-
ment of the directly affected product and for similar
products. The four medical products/product types
chosen were identified based on the availability of: 1) in-
formation in the peer-reviewed literature regarding
product safety, the product recall, and public percep-
tions of the product or product type; 2) robust data re-
garding product usage before and after recall events; and
3) illustrative data and event time lines for examining
the severity and duration of negative halo effects on
medical products perceived to pose the same or similar
risks. Data on public perception or media coverage were
not systematically searched for in the popular press.
However, peer-reviewed literature and scientific reports
were searched and reviewed to add perspective from
physicians or mental health professionals who examined
or attempted to explain differing perceptions among af-
fected patients surrounding the recall or withdrawal
events. Commentaries on patient perceptions that were
presented in scientific papers and peer-reviewed litera-
ture are noted in Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 and on selected
discussion points.
Data regarding intrauterine device (IUD) use in married
contraceptors of 15 to 44 years of age during 1965, 1973,
and 1976 was gathered from the Department of Health
and Human Services Vital and Health Statistics. The
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statistics provided in the survey were based on data col-
lected from the National Fertility Study in 1965, and from
the National Survey of Family Growth in 1973 and 1976
[13]. Data regarding IUD use for all women, regardless of
marital status, were available for 1982, 1995, 2002, and
from 2006 until 2008 from the Department of Health and
Human Services Vital and Health Statistics [14]. National
data on percent contraceptors using the IUD during 1970
and 1988 were reported by Kimble-Haas [15]. Data on
IUD use at the Maryland Family Planning Program during
1973, 1977, 1978, 1981, 1983, 1985, 1988-2001 were re-
ported in Cheng [16] and Hubacher [17].
Silicone gel-filled breast implant data from 1989 to
1997, obtained from the American Society of Recon-
structive Plastic Surgeons (ASRPS), were reported in the
Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) report on the Safety of
Silicone Breast Implants [18]. The committee interpo-
lated the reported rates for certain years by assuming
that non-survey year rates were at the midpoints be-
tween bracketing survey years (e.g., 1990-1992). The
IOM (1999) reported that the implant totals from 1989
through 1997 were 130,000, 130,000, 101,000, 53,000,
59,000, 65,000, 87,000, 108,000, and 146,000, respectively
(total for the period—879,000), and the explants were
12,000, 12,000, 19,000, 26,000, 32,000, 38,000, 26,000,
14,000, and 14,000, respectively (total for the
period—193,000). The American Society of Plastic Sur-
geons (ASPS) also published data regarding procedures
and removals reported by surgeons during 1992, 1994,
1996, and from 2000 to 2012 [19]. The reporting sur-
geon base reportedly included approximately 23,000
physicians between 2000 and 2012 [20]. However, the
surgeon basis reported on prior to 2000 was much
smaller, approximately 3000.
Metal-on-metal hip implant use and explantation data
were extracted from annual reports available online from
the England and Wales National Joint Registry (NJR)
[21, 22] and from published scientific articles based on
data from the NJR [23]. The United Kingdom Joint
registry data was chosen for analysis based on informa-
tion that the voluntary recalls were based in part on data
generated by this registry, and little data available re-
garding the early revision experience in the U.S.
Tysabri patient data were gathered from Elan Corpor-
ation or Biogen Idec Inc. Fourth Quarter Reports for
each calendar year and are based on information from
the TYSABRI Outreach: Unified Commitment to Health
(TOUCH) prescribing program database and other third
party sources [24–31]. All data used in this manuscript
is openly available from the sources described above.





1971 Dalkon Shield IUD introduced on U.S.
market
1972 Public favorable opinion of IUDs
peaks (40 %)
1974 50 % of market share for Dalkon Shield
IUD- unique filament design
1974 Reports of pelvic inflammatory disease
(PID), risk of septic abortion
1974 A.H. Robins Company removes Dalkon
Shield from market
1976 Dalkon Shield sparks FDA medical devices
act of 1976
1970s-1980s Initial studies: all IUDs increase risk; Later
studies: other IUDs safe
1983 FDA: women should remove Dalkon
Shield due to PID
1985 A.H. Robins Company files for bankruptcy
due to class action lawsuit
1985 Public favorable opinion declines to 20 %
1986 Other manufacturers pull IUDs from
market due to economic reasons
1994 Public favorable opinion of all IUDs
declines to 16 %
1996 Only 21 % of women associate term safe
with the use of IUDs
2000s Lack of doctors trained in IUD implantation
Table 2 Key events surrounding FDA moratorium on SGBI
Product Year Event
SGBI 1960s- 1980s SGBI used for breast augmentation
and reconstruction (1 million estimated)
1976 Amendment to FDA Cosmetic Act: FDA
authority to regulate implants
1980s-1990s Capsular contracture most commonly
reported problem, rupture rate 4-6 %
1982 Case reports: connective-tissue disease in
3 Australians; lawsuit ensues
1988 Breast implants- Class III devices: MFs must
document safety, efficacy
1990 Media publicizes concerns, blames FDA for
permitting devices
1991 FDA limits access, MFs must provide positive
demonstration of safety; FDA acknowledges
limited evidence for disease
1992-1993 >2000 articles published on SGBI-related
disease issues; 75 % negative
1993 AMA: anxiety is not warranted based on
current scientific evidence
1994 Removal: augmentation frequencies
increased from 9.2 % to 73 %
1995-1999 Medical Groups: association between SGBI,
connective tissue diseases not proven
2011 FDA concludes SGBI have reasonable
assurance of safety and effectiveness when
used as labeled
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Results
The intrauterine device (IUD)
We identified several key events surrounding the with-
drawal of the Dalkon Shield IUD, as well as documenta-
tion of patient perceptions regarding IUD use from
reports and peer-reviewed studies. Table 1 provides a
chronological summary of selected key events and find-
ings relating to the recall of the Dalkon Shield IUD and
effects on the IUD market in the U.S.
Beginning in the mid-1960s, the IUD was introduced
in the U.S. and was used as a contraceptive product by
an increasing number of women [13]. At the time of its
introduction to the U.S. market in 1971, the Dalkon
Shield did not require FDA approval as a medical device
[16] (Table 1). The Dalkon Shield was used by approxi-
mately 2 million women by 1974 [16, 32]. Based on re-
ports of IUD use during the early 1970s, we estimated
that the Dalkon Shield obtained approximately 50 % of
the IUD market in the U.S. [13, 14, 16, 32, 33] (Table 1).
Time trend data of U.S. women’s attitudes about contra-
ceptive methods, including IUDs, reflect that favorable
opinions on IUD use peaked at approximately 40 % in
1972 [34] (Table 1).
Unlike other IUDs, the Dalkon Shield was designed
with a multifilament string, which was ultimately discov-
ered to promote bacterial infections of the uterus, and
an increased risk of septic abortion if contraception
failed [15, 16, 32]. In 1974, these findings led to the re-
moval of Dalkon Shield IUDs from the market by the
manufacturer, A.H. Robins Company [15, 16, 32, 35]
(Table 1). Congress then passed the 1976 Medical Devices
Amendment, which led to increased FDA regulation and
further investigations of all IUDs during the 1970s and
1980s, which reported higher levels of pelvic inflammatory
disease (PID) in women [36] (Table 1). In 1983, FDA rec-
ommended that women still using Dalkon Shields have
them removed because of increases in PID [16] (Table 1).
Later studies reported that other IUD designs were not as
problematic as the Dalkon Shield [36] (Table 1). Report-
edly because of economic strain from increased litigation
and, specifically, a class action lawsuit, A.H. Robins Com-
pany filed for bankruptcy in 1985 [16, 33] (Table 1). At
this time, it was reported that the percentage of women
with a favorable opinion toward IUDs decreased to 20 %
by 1985 [34] (Table 1). By 1986, only one IUD (Progesta-
sert) remained on the U.S. market, and by 1988, with the
introduction of the Paragard IUD, still only 2 % of contra-
ceptors used IUDs [15, 16]. By 1994, public favorable
opinion decreased to 16 %, and in 1996, it was reported
that only 21 % of the women associated the term “safe”
with IUDs [34] (Table 1).




1930s MoM hip implants first used for
resurfacing and total replacement
1950s MoP implant replaces early gen
MoMs, lower early revision rates
1950s-1970s MoP revision rates favorable at 5
and 10 yrs. post-implantation
1970s-1980s Post ~ 15 years, MoP disintegrates,
causes local inflammation, failure
1990s New gen MoMs in Europe; early
revision rates comparable to MoP
2003 New MoMs sold in the US
2003 DePuy ASR XL Acetabular Hip System
introduced to Europe
2005 DePuy ASR XL Acetabular Hip System
introduced to US
2004- 2012 MoM Case reports: inflammation,
nervous system and heart effects
2008 Zimmer Durom AS MoM withdrawn (US)
2008-2011 Australia and UK hip implant registries:
increased rates of early revision for
ASR XL Acetabular Hip System
2008-2011 Reported increased early revision rates
(certain MoMs): 3 manufacturers remove
devices from markets
2009 DePuy conducts a voluntary recall in
Australia
2010 Worldwide recall of the DePuy ASR
product
2012 Smith and Nephew withdraw R3
Acetabular System with R3 metal
liners (US): reported elevated early
revision rates in conjunction with the
Birmingham Hip Resurfacing System
Post-recall Negative press articles and personal
injury litigation ensue in the US
Table 4 Key events surrounding withdrawal and reintroduction
of Tysabri
Product Year Event
Tysabri 2004 FDA approves Tysabri (natalizumab) for
relapsing-remitting Multiple Sclerosis (RRMS)
2004 Biogen reports 3 cases, 1 fatality, of progressive
multifocal leukoencephalopathy (PML)
2005 Tysabri withdrawn from the market
2006 Clinical trial participants tested for PML; safety
data gathered and reviewed by drug sponsor
and FDA
2006 FDA studies evidence, recommends Tysabri
reintroduced via restricted distribution program
“TOUCH”
Post-2006 Analyses of TOUCH data, clinical trial data, and
continued research help clarify risk of PML;
Health care providers have risk model to quantify
and rank vulnerability to PML for patients
Post-2006 Physicians and patients know more about the
risk of PML to Tysabri; The number of patients
on Tysabri remains well short of expectations.
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According to Department of Health and Human
Services Vital and Health Statistics, approximately
10 % of U.S. contraceptive users chose the IUD in
1970 (Fig. 1) [16]. After the Dalkon Shield IUD was
pulled from the market in 1974, the percentage of
IUD users dropped steadily, from 9.3 % in 1976 to
7.1 % in 1982 [13, 14] (Fig. 1). Following FDA’s rec-
ommendation in 1983 that remaining users remove
their Dalkon Shield device, IUD use among contra-
ceptors fell to 2 % by 1988 as reported by Kimble-
Haas [15] (Fig. 1). In 1982, 2.2 million women still
used IUDs, and by 1988, only 700,000 women used
them [33]. IUD use hit its lowest point in 1995, with
only 0.8 % of U.S. contraceptors choosing IUDs [14]
(Fig. 1). IUD use in Maryland, as documented in the
Maryland Family Planning Program also mirrored the
national decline. In 1973, 19.9 % of contraceptors at
the Maryland Family Planning Program used IUDs;
however, by 1998, only 0.5 % of women used IUDs
[16] (Fig. 1). By 2002, the number of contraceptors
using IUDs rose back to 2 %, and from 2006 to 2008, rose
to 5.5 % of contraceptors in the U.S. [14] (Fig. 1).
Silicone gel-filled breast implants (SGBI)
We identified several key events surrounding the mora-
torium on SGBI, as well as documentation of patient
perceptions regarding SGBI explantation from reports
and peer-reviewed studies. Table 2 provides a chrono-
logical summary of selected key events and findings re-
lating to the FDA limitations on use of SGBI and its
effects on their explantation and continued use on the
medical device market in the U.S.
Since the 1960s, silicone gel-filled breast implants
(SGBI) have been used for breast augmentation and re-
construction. One million women were estimated to
have undergone breast augmentation surgery between
1963 and 1988 [37] (Table 2). The 1976 Medical Devices
Amendment to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
which had been passed because of negative reports re-
garding the Dalkon Shield, provided the FDA authority
to regulate breast implants. In 1982, case reports de-
scribed connective-tissue disease in three Australian
women with SGBIs, and the first multi-million dollar
lawsuit alleging that silicone implants caused systemic
disease was filed in California (Table 2). In 1988, breast
implants were designated as Class III devices, and manu-
facturers were required to document their devices’ safety
and efficacy [38] (Table 2).
The most commonly reported problem with SGBI was
capsular contracture (fibrous tissue capsule formed
around the implant as a foreign body response), which
Gerszten [39] described as potentially involving “moder-
ate to extreme hardening of the breast, tightness, mild to
severe pain, and deformity or distortion of the breast”.
Diagnosis of the severity of capsular contracture is sub-
jective, and thus reports of frequency/severity are diffi-
cult to compare. The reported incidence of contractures
ranged from 0.6 % to 100 % depending on the study
[39]. In addition to capsular contracture, 4 to 6 % of
SGBIs had been reported to rupture based on data
Fig. 1 Intrauterine Device (IUD) use, percent of total contraceptors (1965-2008). Closed circles represent the percentage of married contraceptors,
15 to 44 years of age, using an IUD during 1965, 1973, and 1976, as well as for all women, regardless of marital status, during 1970, 1982, 1988,
1995, 2002, 2006, and 2008. Data were obtained from Department of Health and Human Services Vital and Health Statistics as reported by Mosher [13],
Mosher et al. [14], and Kimble-Haas [15]. Open circles represent the percentage of women in the Maryland Family Planning Program using IUDs during
1973, 1977-1978, 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1988-2001 as reported by Cheng [16] and Hubacher [17]. The arrow indicates the date at which the Dalkon
Shield was voluntarily withdrawn from the market
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reported through the early 1990s [40, 41] (Table 2). It
should be noted that Brown et al. [42] later reported
much higher rates of implant rupture (e.g., ~70 % overall
among asymptomatic women enrolled in the National
Cancer Institute study) with significant correlations to
implant age, implant type (i.e., double vs. single lumen),
implant location (i.e., subglandular vs. submuscular), and
implant manufacturer.
In 1990, a CBS television show (“Face to Face with
Connie Chung”) reported concerns about breast implants
being associated with autoimmune disease, blaming FDA
for permitting hazardous medical devices to be sold [43]
(Table 2). In late 1991, FDA announced a decision to limit
access to SGBIs because many questions remained regard-
ing implant durability/ longevity, rupture rates, and the
composition and potential health consequences of leaking
silicone gel, asserting that the manufacturers did not pro-
vide “a positive demonstration of safety” [41]. However,
FDA officials acknowledged that “the link, if any, between
these implants and immune-related disorders and other
systemic diseases is also unknown” [41]. It was reported
that the occasion of the FDA’s action to limit SGBIs to
only breast reconstruction patients (e.g., breast cancer sur-
gery patients) in regulated clinical trials at the National
Cancer Institute precipitated an increase in negative press
reports about device rupture or leakage and associated
health concerns [44]. Between 1992 and 1993, over 2000
news articles were reportedly published on SGBI-related
disease issues, of which about 75 % had portrayed SGBI in
a negative manner [44] (Table 2).
Although the available published studies on SGBI ex-
planation rates only examined relatively small popula-
tions (e.g., 20-100 cases per study), historical data on
explantations and total breast augmentation procedures
collected by the American Society of Reconstructive
Plastic Surgeons as reported by the Institute of Medicine
[18] and the American Society of Plastic Surgeons [19]
provides clear evidence of dramatic effects on explant-
ation rates soon after the 1991 FDA moratorium. Data
obtained in 1989 and 1990 show that out of 130,000
total procedures, approximately 12,000 removals were
performed (9.2 % removal: augmentation frequency or
RAF) (Fig. 2). Following the moratorium, however, re-
moval rates increased to 18.8 % in 1991, 49.1 % in 1992,
and peaked at 58.5 % in 1994. After 1994, the removal
rates steadily decreased, and were at pre-1991 levels by
1997 (9.6 % RAF). The extremely high explantation rate
following the 1991 FDA moratorium announcement was
also reported by a subset of ASPS member surgeons for
1992 (32,607 augmentation procedures, 18,297 removals;
56.1 % RAF) and 1994 (39,247 augmentation procedures,
28,655 removals; 73.0 % RAF) (Fig. 2).
Several studies reported that patient fears were a pri-
mary reason for explantation of SGBI. Following the an-
nouncement of the FDA moratorium, The American
Medical Association Council on Scientific Affairs urged
physicians to recognize and address the considerable
public anxiety concerning the safety of breast implants,
noting that “this anxiety is not warranted based on
current scientific evidence” [45] (Table 2). In 1995, The
American College of Rheumatology issued a statement
that the association between SGBI and connective tissue
diseases was not proven [46]. In 1997, The American
Academy of Neurology issued a statement that the asso-
ciation between SGBI and neurological diseases was not
proven [47], and in 1998, an Independent Review Group
from the United Kingdom issued a report that con-
cluded that SGBI were not credibly associated with
Fig. 2 Silicone Gel-Filled Breast Implant (SGBI) explantation procedures, percent of total operations (1981-2012). Open diamonds represent SGBI
explantation procedures as a percentage of total procedures from 1989 to 1997. SGBI data from 1989 to 1997 were obtained from the American
Society of Reconstructive Plastic Surgeons (ASRPS), according to the Institute of Medicine’s report on the Safety of Silicone Breast Implants. Closed
circles represent SGBI explantation procedures as a percentage of total procedures during 1992, 1994, 1996, and from 2000 to 2012, as reported by
The American Society of Plastic Surgeons (ASPS). Arrow indicates the 1991 United States Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) moratorium on SGBI
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increased risk of cancer or with unusual connective
tissues diseases [18] (Table 2). Later, in 1999, the U.S.
Institute of Medicine drew similar conclusions about
the weight of scientific evidence on SGBI [18]. Twelve
years later in June, 2011, the FDA issued a report on
the clinical trials of SGBI patients who had been
monitored since the 1991 moratorium and concluded
that these devices “have a reasonable assurance of safety
and effectiveness when used as labeled” [48] (Table 2).
ASPS expanded their data collection surveys to cap-
ture a larger base of their member surgeons between
2000 and 2012 (the database rose from ~ 3000 reporting
surgeons in 1996 to over 20,000 surgeons in 2000). Al-
though ASPS [19] documented a dip in removal during
1996 (87,704 augmentation procedures, 3013 removals;
3.4 % RAF), they subsequently reported a continued
wave of elevated breast implant removals from 2000 to
2004 (e.g., ~40-45,000 removals per year; ~18-20 %
RAF). For this time period, ASPS [19] reported that the
vast majority of explantations occurred in conjunction
with new silicone-shell saline-filled implant replacement
(70-89 % per year). For 2005 to 2012, ASPS [19] re-
ported that annual rates for implant removals were
lower and relatively stable (e.g., ~20-27,000 removals per
year; 6.8 to 8.5 % RAF).
Metal-on-metal (MoM) hip implants
We identified several key events surrounding the volun-
tary recalls of select MoM hip implants. Table 3 provides
a chronological summary of selected key events and
findings relating to the voluntary recalls of certain MoM
hip implants and subsequent effects on their explant-
ation and continued use on the medical device market
in the U.S., U.K., and Australia.
MoM hip implants have been utilized for hip resurfacing
and total hip replacement since the 1930s, although the
development of a metal-on-polyethylene (MoP) implant
by Charnley in the late 1950s largely replaced the early
generation of MoM implants because of lower early revi-
sion rates [49, 50] (Table 3). The Charnley MoP device
was found to perform well in assessments of revision rates
at five and ten years post-implantation [51], but in the
1970s and 1980s, evidence showed that after about
15 years in situ, the polyethylene acetabular cup material
more frequently disintegrated and generated plastic wear
debris that caused local inflammatory responses and fail-
ure because of loosening at the femoral stem and/or the
acetabular cup [52, 53] (Table 3). Despite good overall per-
formance, the MoP hip implant could be expected to fail
after about 10-15 years in service [52, 54], leading to a
greater likelihood of multiple traumatic hip replacement
surgeries for hip implant patients who were younger and/
or more active. To help resolve this problem, a new gener-
ation of MoM implant designs was then pursued in hopes
of reducing the likelihood of late failures due to material
breakdown and loosening. Indeed, some patients with
early generation MoM implants were reported to have
good performance for more than 25 years [55–63]. In
addition, more resilient high carbon content alloys and
improved manufacturing techniques allowed for a new
generation of MoM devices with exceptionally low rates of
wear at the articulating surfaces [64–66].
The new generation of MoM hip implants were first
marketed in Europe in the 1990s and showed promising
results comparable to MoP devices with respect to early
revision rates [49, 50] (Table 3). These newer MoMs
were not allowed to be sold in the U.S. until about 2003,
however, because of the more stringent FDA approval
process (Table 3). A few case reports identifying unusual
inflammatory responses in MoM patients were identified
prior to 2008 [57, 67–70], but, subsequently, several add-
itional reports appeared regarding early revisions due to
inflammatory responses and other effects on the nervous
system and the heart in MoM patients [71–75] (Table 3).
An increase of MoM hip implant recalls or market
withdrawals occurred between 2008 and 2012. In 2008,
the Zimmer Durom Acetabular System, an MoM design,
was withdrawn from the U.S. market because of sus-
pected higher revision rates associated with inadequate
surgical procedures leading to misalignment and early
revision [76] (Table 3). Between 2008 and 2011, hip im-
plant registries in Australia and the United Kingdom
separately reported observing increased rates of early re-
vision for the DePuy Articular Surface Replacement
(ASR XL) Acetabular Hip System, another MoM design
that was introduced to the market in Europe in 2003
and to the U.S. market in 2005. Although there was sus-
picion by DePuy that inadequate surgical procedures
were to blame for the increased early revision rates re-
port for the ASR, DePuy decided to conduct a voluntary
recall in Australia starting in 2009, and implemented a
worldwide voluntary recall of the ASR product in 2010
(Table 3). In June of 2012, Smith and Nephew conducted
a U.S. market withdrawal of the R3 Acetabular System
with R3 metal liners because of reports of elevated early
revision rates in conjunction with the Birmingham Hip
Resurfacing System [77] (Table 3).
Figure 3 shows data on the number of MoM devices
implanted in England and Wales between 2003 and
2011, identifying a rapid decline starting in 2009 when
DePuy announced its first ASR recall in Australia. Des-
pite the fact that this recall was only of a single product,
use rates for all MoM devices including both hip resur-
facing and total hip replacements of all device brands
were affected. The voluntary recalls of these MoM de-
vices stemmed from hip revision rate data generated by
national joint registries in Australia [78] and the United
Kingdom [21–23]. Figure 4 illustrates the findings on 3-
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year revision rates for MoM implants assessed in 2008
(monitoring patients from 2003 to 2007) and again in
2011 (monitoring patients from 2008 to 2011) showing
an approximate 4-fold increase (Table 3). Comparable
increases were reported for MoM patients enrolled in
the Australian Joint Registry [21, 22] and in some
Canadian institution-based analyses [71–73], although
little data is available regarding the early revision
experience in the U.S. Subsequently, negative press
articles were published regarding potential dangers of
MoM implants, and associated personal injury litiga-
tion ensued in the U.S. (Table 3).
Tysabri (natalizumab)
Table 4 provides a chronological summary of selected
key events and findings relating to the voluntary recall
Fig. 3 Implantations of Stemmed metal-on-metal (MOM) Devices in England and Wales (2003-2011). Based on Smith et al. [23]. Also identified are
key dates of the voluntary recall of the Zimmer Durom Cup in the United States in July 2008, the Australian recall of the DePuy ASR in 2009, and
the worldwide voluntary recall of the DePuy ASR in 2010
Fig. 4 Three-year revision rates over time. The average 3-year revision rate for metal-on-metal total hip replacements (THR) and for hip resurfacing
over the time periods April 2003 through September 2007 and from April 2003 through December 2010; based on results reported in the 2008
and 2011 Annual Reports of the England and Wales National Joint Registry
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of Tysabri and effects of subsequent research and FDA
advisories on recovery of the drug’s use in the U.S.
Multiple Sclerosis (MS) is a chronic inflammatory dis-
ease of the central nervous system. Patients with MS can
experience debilitating physical symptoms ranging from
fatigue to bladder and bowel problems and cognitive im-
pairments involving vision, learning, and memory. Spe-
cific symptoms vary from person-to-person, but patients
are generally grouped as “progressive” or “relapsing-
remitting.” People with “progressive” forms of MS can
experience gradually worsening problems with walking
and mobility in addition to other physical and cognitive
symptoms; people with “relapsing-remitting” MS (RRMS)
experience cycles of exacerbations followed by periods of
recovery. Tysabri (natalizumab) is a potent disease-
modifying treatment for RRMS. The drug was fast-
track-approved by FDA in 2004 (Table 4). At the time
of its approval, Tysabri was presented as an innovative
breakthrough treatment [79]. Shortly after its approval,
the drug’s sponsor, Biogen, reported three cases (including
one fatality) of a rare but severe and opportunistic viral in-
fection of the brain, called progressive multifocal leukoen-
cephalopathy (PML) (Table 4). Based on this apparent
association, Tysabri was withdrawn from the market in
2005 (Table 4). Beginning in 2006, clinical trial partici-
pants were tested for PML, and safety data were gathered
and reviewed by the drug sponsor and the FDA (Table 4).
An FDA advisory committee studied the evidence and
recommended that Tysabri be reintroduced via a re-
stricted distribution program, “TOUCH” (TYSABRI
Outreach: Unified Commitment to Health) [80] (Table 4).
Since 2006, analyses of TOUCH data, clinical trial data,
and continuing research have helped to clarify the risk of
PML, leading to the approval of a new test to assist in
PML risk stratification for Tysabri patients in 2012
(Table 4). Thus, health care providers now have a risk
model to quantify and rank vulnerability to PML for
patients considering Tysabri. Specifically, the presence of
antibodies associated with the virus that causes PML in
persons with longer duration of Tysabri treatment
(>2 years) and prior use of immunosuppressant medica-
tion are known to increase risk [81]. Tysabri patients with
all three known risk factors have an estimated risk of PML
of 11/1000, whereas the risk of PML among other patients
can range from ~1/1000 in antibody-negative persons to
~4/1000 in some antibody-positive persons [81, 82]. Risk
assessment of potential Tysabri patients since 2006 has
improved health and safety of this treatment regimen, in-
cluding collecting baseline MRI data to help distinguish
damage due to PML onset from pre-existing MS lesions,
regular antibody testing, and a decline of >2 year treat-
ment durations [82].
Before the withdrawal of Tysabri in 2005, approxi-
mately 18,000 patients had received Tysabri, including
4300 patients during clinical trials and an additional
13,700 patients post-marketing (Fig. 5). After reintroduc-
tion to the prescription drug market in 2006, patient en-
rollment and sales of Tysabri became more uncertain
and slowed considerably relative to initial expectations
for the drug [83] (Fig. 5). Even after Tysabri was
Fig. 5 Annual and cumulative patient exposure to Tysabri (2004-2012). Data are from Elan Corporation or Biogen Idec Inc. Fourth Quarter Reports
for each calendar year and are based on information from the TYSABRI Outreach: Unified Commitment to Health (TOUCH) prescribing program
database and other third party sources. Arrows identify key dates of FDA initial approval (November 23, 2004), withdrawal (February 28, 2005),
re-market authorization under the TOUCH restricted distribution program (June 5, 2006), FDA approval of Tysabri for Crohn’s Disease (January 14,
2008), and approval of a new test to assist in PML risk stratification for Tysabri
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approved for Crohn’s Disease on January 14, 2008, and
predictions were adjusted, new patient growth continued
to be slower than predicted [31, 84]. The number of pa-
tients in 2010 was less than 80,000, well short of the
100,000 patient expectation announced by Biogen post-
PML in 2008.
Discussion
We defined the four cases above as “highly beneficial”
based on several lines of evidence: 1) in the case of the
Dalkon Shield IUD, the peer-reviewed literature sup-
ported the efficacy of and patient satisfaction with the
IUD [16, 34, 36]; 2) SGBI had been estimated to be used
by nearly one million women [37], demonstrated rela-
tively low rate of rupture-related device failures and few
reported serious clinical consequences through the late
1980s [43], and had been declared by the FDA, in 2011,
as reasonably safe and effective based on clinical moni-
toring [48]; 3) MoM hip implants were reported to have
good performance for more than 25 years [55–63], and
exceptionally low rates of wear at the articulating sur-
faces [64–66]; and 4) Tysabri benefits outweighed the
risk of PML in patients with appropriate MRI and anti-
body screening results [85]. Based on our review of the
use data and documentation of patient and public
sentiments surrounding each device or drug, we de-
termined that these examples illustrated overgenerali-
zations, such as a negative halo effect and spillover
effect, and we found that certain common factors ap-
pear to affect all four examples of consumer usage of
the medical devices and drugs.
Patient fear
A negative halo effect may be driven predominantly by
patient anxiety rather than by adverse clinical outcomes.
The consequences of patient fear were apparent for all
three of the implanted medical device examples, since
the rate of more serious adverse health impacts from
each device was low, while the rate of explantation soon
after the stigma was propagated was high. Similarly, in
the case of Tysabri, even with a risk assessment system
that can predict adverse clinical outcomes, patients and
physicians may decide to discontinue using Tysabri due
to patient concerns, even when the benefits of treatment
appear to outweigh the risks.
The high rates of SGBI patient requests for implant re-
moval in the U.S. were studied in some detail during the
1990s, and were largely attributed to patient fears rather
than unexpected clinical consequences of the device.
Rohrich et al. [86] reported that 282 of 720 patients
(29.2 %) referred for possible SGBI removal between
December, 1992 and January, 1996 underwent explant-
ation; the most common reasons for explantation were
“ruptured implants, severe or recurrent capsular
contractures, and desire for elective removal based upon
continued concern about silicone gel-filled implants”.
Slavin and Goldwyn [87] studied 46 SGBI patients who
underwent explantation and reported that 45 % of them
said that fears based on media reports had driven their
decision. However, 74 % of these explantation patients
had their SGBI devices replaced with saline-filled (silicone
shell) implants that might pose similar risks associated
with the device shell [87]. Similar findings were re-
ported in several other small studies of SGBI explant-
ation study groups in the 1990s [86, 88–92]. Some
researchers have suggested that patients with depres-
sion and other neurologic diseases (e.g., somatization,
obsessive-compulsiveness, hostility, and anxiety) were
over-represented among those seeking SGBI explant-
ation [88, 89, 92], and among those reporting more
numerous subjective complaints [93]. However, significant
patient fear of implant-related health problems, regardless
of depression or other mental health issues, is considered
an adequate clinical indication for SGBI removal or re-
placement [94]. The data demonstrate an initial rise in
SGBI removal frequency immediately after the FDA mora-
torium that may represent the most fearful individuals
among the large population of SGBI patients at the time.
With the continued negative press and publicity due to
mass tort litigation regarding these implants through the
late 1990s, the elevated rate of SGBI removals apparently
continued for more than a decade, and then fell to a lower,
stable rate starting in 2005 (Fig. 2).
Patient and physician anxiety may have also played a
role in decisions to remove MoM hip implants. With the
three voluntary MoM hip implant device recalls in place,
surgeons were likely to recommend alternative, non-
MoM devices to avoid a possible repeat of early revision,
even if their track record with these devices had been
favorable. Perhaps more important is the potential ef-
fect of these recalls on decisions to explant MoM de-
vices in the absence of clinical signs that would
normally be required to support a recommendation of
revision (e.g., clinically important periprosthetic inflam-
mation, pain, and/or limited range of motion). As seen
with SGBI following the FDA moratorium, patients or
physicians might reasonably perceive that a voluntary
product recall suggests there is sufficient reason to re-
move the device as a result of patient fears alone. Thus,
assessment of a patient’s subjective fears may in some
cases supersede an individual-specific analysis of the
risk versus benefit based on objective clinical signs.
However, the potentially complicated and traumatic
surgical procedures that may be involved with hip revi-
sion surgery must be carefully considered.
There could be other explanations for increased revi-
sion rates of MoM hip implants. The second generation
MoM hip implants generated lower volumes of wear
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debris than the more common metal-on-polyethylene
(MoP) implants that typically failed after a 10- to 15-
year useful lifespan [52, 54, 64–66, 95]. Hence, MoM hip
implants could be used in younger and more active indi-
viduals in hopes of longer useful lifespans, since reports
have identified first generation MoM implant survival
with good function beyond 25 years [55–63, 96]. This
durability aspect may correspond to a broader set of pa-
tient characteristics and implant performance demands.
For example, a greater fraction of younger patients could
increase the population with congenital hip dysplasia or
traumatic injuries leading to an increased potential for
implant failure when compared to osteoarthritis patient
populations. In addition, assurances of improved dur-
ability could also lead younger or more active patients to
exceed limitations on activities that increase implant
wear and/or risk of re-injury of the hip joint, with the
potential for an increased risk of implant failure beyond
that expected for older osteoarthritis patients. Thus, the
unique demographics of the MoM population may have
led to increased numbers of revision surgeries. Addition-
ally, in younger/healthy patients, the risk of harm may
not be sufficient to warrant revision surgery based on
fears alone.
It should also be noted that Reito et al. [97] reported
that “indications for revision surgery can vary greatly be-
tween different surgeons and different hospitals. Some
surgeons may prefer closer follow-up in cases where
others would prefer revision surgery. The current litera-
ture lacks a specific definition for adverse reaction to
metal debris (ARMD) and especially the indications for
revision. Due to these implant and inter-observer related
differences, a high heterogeneity is observed.” The extent
to which physician or patient fear also contribute to this
heterogeneity is unclear [97].
Patient and physician fear of previous risks may have
also impacted the effects on Tysabri use. After Tysabri
was placed back on the market and warnings of PML
risk were added, RRMS patients were caught in a quan-
dary. Patients who were not yet on Tysabri had to weigh
the risk of worsening MS versus the risk of acquiring
PML. Those patients who were already on Tysabri and
who had experienced significant quality of life improve-
ments were faced with the fact that the risk of acquiring
PML was increasing with duration of treatment. Inter-
views of Tysabri patients in 2009 suggested that even
after treatment had begun and general fears associated
with Tysabri treatment abated, a heightened uncertainty
about PML continued [98]. Patients chose treatments in
consultation with their physicians and, at a time when
there were few alternative treatments of similar potency
available, some patients were willing to accept greater
risks than their physicians would consider acceptable.
Despite the fact that patients and physicians today have
a similar appreciation of the risks of PML, physicians are
more risk averse than their patients about Tysabri, pos-
sibly because of concerns about patient safety and risk of
mal-practice litigation [99, 100].
Spillover effect
Similar to Vioxx [11], the negative halo effect generated
by negative reports on one particular device can create a
spillover effect, in which the stigma rapidly spreads to
affect use patterns for arguably dissimilar products in
the same category. This phenomenon clearly occurred in
the U.S. following withdrawal of the Dalkon Shield and
MoM hip implants, as reflected in decreased usage
across all devices of a category as a result of the negative
reports and mass litigation.
Following the removal of the Dalkon Shield from the
market in 1974, the use of all IUDs began to decline,
even though numerous IUDs remained on the U.S. mar-
ket, including the Copper 7 and the Tatum T, which
were introduced in 1974 and 1978, respectively [16].
Similarly, reports of increased early revision rates for
certain MoM products between about 2008 and 2011
led three separate manufacturers to remove the poten-
tially problematic devices from the market in the U.S.
and elsewhere while other popular MoM products
remained on the market. Subsequently, numerous nega-
tive press articles were published regarding potential
dangers of MoM implants, and associated personal in-
jury litigation ensued in the U.S. involving thousands of
individual cases. The voluntary withdrawal of the three
hip implant devices and associated negative press reports
led to dramatic declines in physician use of MoM de-
vices generally, likely reflecting a stigma effect on sur-
geons as well as their hip implant patients, comparable
to the decline in IUD use after the Dalkon Shield with-
drawal (Fig. 1). Despite the fact that this recall was only
of a single product, the stigma appeared to affect use
rates for all MoM devices including both hip resurfacing
and total hip replacements of all device brands (Fig. 3).
The effect of stigma on Tysabri use as a treatment for
Multiple Sclerosis and Crohn’s Disease differs from the
negative halo effect seen for the medical device examples
and for Vioxx and similar drugs. Tysabri is one drug
among a relatively small number of available treatment
options for these diseases, and may exhibit potentially
severe side effects and inconsistent efficacy for each. Its
continued use today in conjunction with more detailed
warnings and medical screening to limit the risk of se-
vere side effects is perhaps a reflection of its smaller pa-
tient population and limited number of similarly
efficacious treatments for these particular diseases. In
contrast, a wide variety of anti-inflammatory drugs of
arguably similar efficacy and more limited side effects
were available to replace Vioxx. Moreover, the large
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patient population taking Vioxx afforded more oppor-
tunities to identify and recruit a large and diverse plain-
tiff population for profitable and sustained campaigns
in personal injury litigation against the makers of Vioxx
in the U.S.
Uncertain scientific findings
Third, a negative halo effect on an entire category of
medical devices can be sustained regardless of the scien-
tific findings pertaining to safety. Patient anxiety gener-
ated by uncertainties often relate to conflicting or
incomplete scientific evidence. In regard to the Dalkon
Shield IUD, increased FDA regulation, negative press re-
ports, and litigation concerning the Dalkon Shield
prompted further investigations of all IUDs during the
1970s and 1980s. These studies suggested that using
IUDs generally contributed to higher levels of pelvic in-
flammatory disease (PID) in women [36]. Although the
initial studies reported that all IUDs, regardless of design
differences, increased the risk for PID, other IUD de-
signs were later shown not to be as problematic as the
Dalkon Shield. Thus, the risk for PID in other IUDs was
reported to have been overestimated [36]. Cheng [16]
summarized numerous studies indicating that the risk
for PID was no higher in non-Dalkon Shield-IUD users
who were at a low risk for sexually transmitted diseases
(STDs) than for those using no contraception. In fact,
when studies were adjusted for confounding variables
such as sexual behavior, IUD use was not found to be
predictive of PID [101]. Furthermore, misconceptions re-
garding using IUDs as an abortifacient and their role in
infertility were prevalent [101].
However, as noted by Hubacher [101], even when con-
sidering data to the contrary, the stigma regarding the
IUD was difficult to overcome. He explained: “Even weak
research that supports these arguments can appear to
make the claims irrefutable. Research that generates
results counter to these assumptions has to be flawless,
unchallengeable and repeated to have any lasting im-
pact. Thus, although the most recent research has
shown these assumptions to be unwarranted, the con-
troversy continues” [101]. Thus, though the design flaw
of the Dalkon Shield was markedly different from other
IUDs, assumptions regarding research studies that
grouped all IUDs together altered women’s perceptions
and led to lower rates of IUD use for decades.
Additionally, Forrest [34] reported on a survey con-
ducted in 1991 that examined the method by which
women received their information regarding IUDs. Al-
though 52 % of women received information from their
doctor or doctor’s office, nearly 25 % of women received
primary information from magazines, books, advertising,
or educational TV, and another 19 % received informa-
tion from friends and relatives [34]. In fact, younger
women and Hispanic women born outside the U.S. were
reported to be more likely to be interested in using an
IUD versus older women and women born in the U.S.
or Puerto Rico [34]. Based on these statistics, one can
hypothesize that the stigma created from the negative
publicity regarding the Dalkon Shield had a greater ef-
fect on exposure to the negative information, which was
more broadly publicized in the U.S. than in other coun-
tries [102]. The uncertain scientific findings regarding
various studied IUDs, negative reports from the Dalkon
Shield incident, and the resulting voluntary removal of
the Dalkon Shield from the market, had both immediate
and lasting effects on women’s aversion to choosing
IUDs as their method of contraception (Table 1, Fig. 1),
despite their proven safety and efficacy [15, 16, 36, 101].
Similar to the IUD saga, uncertain scientific findings
plagued the reputation of SGBIs as a product type, re-
gardless of design features or manufacturer. Excepting
the common occurrence of capsular contracture, SGBIs
were presumed to be reasonably safe through the late
1980s given their relatively low rate of rupture-related
device failures and few reported serious clinical conse-
quences [43]. Furthermore, capsular contractures are
not unique to SGBIs, and have been shown to also occur
with saline-filled silicone shell implants that ultimately
replaced SGBIs in the medical device market [39]. Fur-
thermore, reported rupture rates by Brown et al. may
have been overstated since all degrees of implant col-
lapse based on radiologic assessment were grouped to-
gether (i.e., including subclinical changes) and the
majority of these asymptomatic patients had their SGBI
implants for more than 15 years [42]. It is clear that
breast implants cannot be reasonably expected to last
for a lifetime. Indeed, the need for explantation and/or
replacement of breast implants due to leakage or col-
lapse after many years in situ can be expected due to the
commonality of contracture and potential implant
trauma related to procedures for release of contracture.
The FDA moratorium decision on SGBI occurred after
a CBS television show in 1990 (“Face to Face with Con-
nie Chung”) had sensationalized the concerns about
breast implants being associated with autoimmune dis-
ease, blaming FDA for permitting hazardous medical de-
vices to be sold [43]. In 1991, when FDA decided to
limit access to SGBIs, SGBIs had not been recalled by
their manufacturers, and had been in use for nearly
three decades for elective breast augmentation and re-
construction without reports of excessive rates of rup-
ture or associated clinical disease. Yet a formalized
monitoring program to evaluate SGBI patients was not
in place to provide convincing data on their safety
and/or implant longevity. Furthermore, despite the
litigation-related claims of SGBI-associated connective
tissue disease, no epidemiological studies regarding
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connective tissue disease in women with SGBIs had been
performed prior to 1994 [43]. Later, the scientific evidence
for hypothesized associations between SGBI and certain
disease states such as connective tissue diseases, breast
cancer, and neurologic complaints was evaluated by a var-
iety of medical authorities over the prior two decades,
with the uniform conclusion being that these associations
were very weak and not well validated. Thus, in general, it
appears that published medical advice in statements from
medical authorities regarding the tenuous nature of scien-
tific evidence for SGBI-disease associations was not
heeded by U.S. patients or plastic surgeons through the
1990s and early 2000s.
Angell [43] and others [44, 90, 103, 104] have noted
that sensational media reports, combined with even an
ambiguous endorsement of concern by FDA, can lead to
stigma that is nearly impossible to undo, even after the
weight of scientific evidence has become clear. Handel
et al. [44] reported that “negative media publicity may
cause unnecessary anxiety, depression and remorse” and
lead to decreased patient satisfaction and ~5-fold greater
frequency of implant removal requests when comparing
patient views before versus after the FDA moratorium.
Handel et al. [44] also noted that while satisfaction is de-
termined by whether the patient herself has experienced
complications (like implant rupture or capsular contrac-
ture issues), “our study discloses that media reports have
a major effect on patient concern.” The SGBI story illus-
trates the role that media reports can play in presenting
tenuous scientific information as known facts and
thereby increasing patient fears that can trigger high
rates of device removal following the 1991 FDA mora-
torium. Notably, the most prominent problem with
SGBI (capsular contracture) was not resolved with the
subsequent generation of saline-filled, silicone shell
breast implants. Moreover, there was a relatively low rate
of SGBI failure due to implant rupture (~5 %), so the
clinical benefits of explantation were absent in the vast
majority of cases, other than helping to resolve anxiety
from the stigma on SGBI induced by the 1991 FDA
moratorium. With an estimated one million U.S. women
having these breast implants as of the early 1990s [43],
the stigma from the FDA moratorium and associated
news reports [44] and litigation generated patient uncer-
tainty, and likely unnecessary explantation surgeries in
the absence of strong or consistent scientific support.
As with SGBI, some authors have commented on pub-
lication bias regarding failure and explantation of MoM
hip implants, particularly regarding the Articular Surface
Replacement XL Total Hip Arthroplasty device (ASR XL
THA) that was subject to a worldwide manufacturer re-
call and multi-district litigation in the United States.
Reito and colleagues [97] recently examined the preva-
lence of MoM hip implant failure due to adverse
reaction to metal debris (ARMD) including a systematic
literature review and meta regression analysis. These au-
thors reported that publication bias may have affected
available scientific studies regarding potential health
effects from MoM hip implants in that the year of
publication was an important variable to consider as a
confounder in their analysis. The authors noted that,
“there has been considerable publication bias in the
MoM literature during recent years. As a result, there
has been a strong tendency to publish as high as
possible prevalences of pseudotumors and ARMD. […]
Moreover, prior to 2010, MoM hip replacements were
popular and there was a trend toward positive results
instead. The trend towards positive results can be
observed in the numerous studies that report favorable
results with the Birmingham Hip Resurfacing (BHR)
device. Furthermore, to support this statement, there
are no studies prior to 2010 that have reported, for
example, the results of the ASR XL THR, which was
eventually shown to have been disastrous”
As noted earlier, the lack of a clear definition for
ARMD and/or general agreement among hip surgeons
on objective criteria for ARMD-related revision surgery
has made meta-regression analysis difficult to interpret
[97]. Thus, widespread publication of heterogeneous and
arguably equivocal scientific findings regarding MoM-
related ARMD is influenced by the clearly unfavorable
findings for the ASR XL THA device and may have cre-
ated a high potential for spillover of stigma across all
MoM hip implants.
Furthermore, litigation pressure related to defective
product/personal injury claims publicized by legal
counsel and news media in the U.S. can lead to sus-
tained stigma on an entire category of medical devices
regardless of how limited or tenuous the scientific find-
ings might be on a given product. This influence has
clearly affected use and explantation rates for IUDs and
SGBI, and will likely occur with MoM hip implants go-
ing forward. And in the case of SGBI, the replacement
(saline implant) product was comprised of a silicone
shell that likely posed similar risks for the most promin-
ent clinical problem (contracture) associated with SGBIs.
Notably, after two decades of clinical trials, FDA deter-
mined that SGBIs were reasonably safe in 2011 [48]. In
regard to Tysabri, patients often discontinue Tysabri as
they approach 24 months of treatment, even though risk
analyses show continuing treatment may be prudent, as
the benefits of Tysabri outweigh the risk of PML in
patients with appropriate MRI and antibody screening
results [85]. Moreover, demonstrably superior MS
treatment options have yet to emerge, and, for some
patients, Tysabri may be the most viable treatment
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option in terms of efficacy and/or risk of serious side
effects [105–107]. The Tysabri case brings up numer-
ous questions: what is the degree to which uncer-
tainty and fear contribute to treatment decisions?
How much are treatment decisions impacted by a
state-of-the-art understanding of risks versus risk
communication and risk comprehension? A technical
characterization of PML risks clearly may not be in
and of itself enough to address the fear and uncer-
tainty the average patient feels.
Persistence of negative halo effect
Recovery of a product’s safety reputation and prevalent
use may take decades in the U.S., even while these prod-
ucts may exhibit widespread use and good safety records
in other countries. The recovery of contraceptive market
share for IUDs in the U.S. market took decades to re-
cover, even while IUD usage in Europe and other coun-
tries remained higher and consistent. Negative publicity
surrounding the Dalkon Shield influenced IUD use in
the U.S. for decades, as evidenced by the drop in favor-
able opinions from 1972 to 1994, as well as the precipi-
tous drop in IUD use and slow recovery in the early
2000s (Table 1). Interestingly, though fewer women in
the U.S. utilized IUDs when compared to other methods
of contraception, Forrest reported that users were
“highly satisfied” with them [34]. In fact, the efficacy of
IUDs in preventing pregnancy is reported to be compar-
able to surgical sterilization, and the overall costs to the
patient are lower than those for other contraceptive
methods [16, 36].
With over 100 million contraceptors using IUDs
worldwide, this method is reportedly used by more
women than any other reversible method of birth con-
trol [16, 36]. Presently, only hormone delivery devices
and the copper ParaGard device are used in the U.S.,
despite the fact that several other options are used in
Europe [16, 101, 108]. Sonfield [35] reported that only
5.5 % of contraceptors in the U.S. use an IUD, as opposed
to up to 27 % of contraceptors in European nations, such
as Norway. Moreover, Hubacher [101] reported that 21 %
of contraceptors in Mexico use an IUD. Thus, the stigma
created from the Dalkon Shield saga not only affected the
product itself, but had a lasting impact (decades long) on
the prevalence of IUD use generally in the U.S.
Interestingly, rates of IUD use are increasing in the
U.S. within the past decade, probably because of the
maturation of a new consumer group and a growing
number of medical practitioners who were not prac-
ticing professionals at the height of the Dalkon Shield
saga. Thus, the stigma appears to be fading. However,
according to Sonfield [35], the stigma of the Dalkon
Shield had “a lingering, indirect impact.” Because of the
stigma regarding IUDs, few doctors have been trained in
IUD implantation in the U.S. because so few patients
have used these devices over the last few decades [33].
Now, when the stigma regarding IUDs appears to be
diminishing, access to the IUD may be limited even for
women who choose it, due to the lack of U.S. practi-
tioners who are trained in the insertion and prescription
of the IUD [33].
As seen following the 1991 FDA moratorium on SGBI,
a stigma-related increase in explantation procedures can
reasonably be expected to be seen as a result of the
negative press reports and massive U.S. litigation regard-
ing the recalled MoM devices. The rate of SGBI revision
due to rupture was only about 5 %, yet a sustained in-
crease in explantation rates was documented over time
that was more likely generated by fears as opposed to
objective clinical outcomes (Fig. 2). For MoM implants,
the rate of early revision related to severe local inflam-
matory responses appears to be on the order of 5 to
10 %, although a few higher estimates have been re-
ported. Like the capsular contracture response com-
monly seen in SGBI and other breast implant patients,
the local tissue inflammatory responses in MoM patients
occur over a broad spectrum of severity, and are affected
by subjective tolerance factors; thus, rates of clinically
necessary revisions may be difficult to discern. Given the
extensive U.S. litigation and negative publicity regarding
MoM implants in the past few years, decisions on device
explantation likely will be influenced by recall-related
stigma, and elevated revision rates will be observed for
many years to come.
The emergence of alternative therapies combined with
Tysabri’s history present a kind of inertia that is not so
easily overcome. Both physicians and patients know
more about the risk of PML to Tysabri patients today
than they did in 2005. Nevertheless, the growth in the
number of patients on Tysabri remains well short of
expectations.
The four examples cited above illustrate that negative
news media reports and defective product/personal in-
jury litigation regarding the potential health hazards
posed by medical devices and drugs can greatly impact
use rates in the U.S. market. Such negative impacts on
use patterns of medical treatments may occur even when
the scientific support for such dangers is tenuous, and
may be sustained for many years due to the often pro-
tracted nature of personal injury litigation. This negative
halo effect has affected many drugs and medical devices
that were withdrawn from the market for different rea-
sons, and also affects products that were never directly
implicated as having safety issues.
Study limitations
This analysis has several limitations. Given that this was
a retrospective analysis of complex phenomena involving
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mixed social roles (e.g. patient, physician, consumer),
the testing of our hypothesis regarding the impact of
overgeneralizations on patient perceptions and decisions
were often unquantifiable and partially dependent on
limited data sets collected around the time of the recalls.
Furthermore, the selected examples were identified in
part by the volume of available data and published infor-
mation and are not based on a systematic search and
content analysis of all potentially relevant media reports
or on the collection of new survey data; hence, they
highlight more controversial decisions that other re-
searchers have chosen to comment upon. Also, there are
many social and cultural aspects that can influence med-
ical decisions at different institutions (e.g., government
agencies or healthcare providers or insurers) and at dif-
ferent levels of perceived authority (e.g., regulators or re-
searchers or physicians), and this analysis only touches
upon limited aspects. Additionally, risk perception by
patients and physicians and associated stigma-related ac-
tions are complex social and psychological phenomena
that have been discussed only briefly. We aimed to com-
pensate for these potential limitations in our method-
ology, which included a multifaceted description of each
recall or withdrawal case, including analysis of usage
data, peer reviewed literature regarding product efficacy,
product safety, consumer perceptions of products over
time, and changes in regulation in order to identify the
presence of overgeneralizations, such as the halo effect
and spillover effect, and the impact they had on product
use, public health decisions, and policy shifts. The ana-
lysis of these cases demonstrates that these overgenerali-
zations may have contributed to the decline of a
product’s usage and impacts on public health.
Study implications
This analysis increases our understanding of the multi-
tude of factors that impact the use of beneficial medical
devices or drugs and can help us make decisions to iden-
tify and mitigate overgeneralizations that may have nega-
tive impacts on public health. For example, it may be
possible to prevent or mitigate the types of overgenerali-
zations described here. However, mere “education” is
not enough; since overgeneralizations are unconscious
and automatically applied, simply knowing more may
not be helpful to a layperson unless those persons be-
come experts with respect to the risks they face. Inter-
estingly, formal risk analytic processes were successfully
developed for Tysabri once the PML risk factors became
clearer. The adoption of formal decision analytic tools
by physicians helped both physicians and their patients
[109]. Additionally, improving awareness of the fact that
we are subject to biases may help. For example, drawing
patients or consumer attention to the halo effect may
mitigate the consequences of the halo effect [110].
As risk perception has social and cultural components,
there is a limit to what can be accomplished at the individ-
ual person level. To reduce a negative halo effect leading
to a withdrawal or recall event, or following an event,
manufacturers and regulators must work closely together
to develop strategic approaches to risk communication.
Notably, all three implant devices reviewed in this manu-
script could be interpreted as being ‘grandfathered-in’
(e.g., by pre-regulation usage and/or being considered sub-
stantially similar to a previously tested/approved device)
under the concurrent FDA regulatory approval system
without receiving sufficient safety testing. However, op-
posing interests might argue that ongoing patient moni-
toring during successful clinical use of these devices over
decades should be carefully considered as proof of safety.
In that respect, one of the lessons learned from these cases
is that product manufacturers must more broadly under-
stand their product. More specifically, after FDA approval,
manufacturers should plan on implementing a formalized
and adaptable monitoring program that obtains objective
data to address any health concerns that may arise. This
program should characterize the nature and magnitude of
the potential health risk and communicate any such infor-
mation to current and future patient consumers and their
physicians. Product manufacturers must be prepared to
answer difficult questions (e.g., factors affecting implant
durability/longevity or unrecognized disease associations)
with data generated through ongoing monitoring of the
patient consumers over time.
The quality of reporting of scientific findings and un-
certainty regarding scientific findings and negative out-
comes heavily influences negative media and consumer
behavior [111]. According to Nelkin (1995), risk report-
ing can be sensational, confused, and misinformed [111].
The media rely on available information from sources
that can perpetuate confusion during rapidly unfolding
events [111]. An example of this scenario was recently
reported on by Matthews et al. [112], in which the authors
documented a decrease in statin use by current users fol-
lowing a high media coverage period. The authors de-
scribed the coverage as an “intense” public discussion over
the risks-benefit balance of statins. Such widely covered
health stories can lead to a lack of clarity and have the po-
tential to impact healthcare related behavior [112]. Thus,
product manufacturers should attend closely to the emer-
gence and spread of powerful narratives driven by uncer-
tainty and fear of side effects. It is important to note
impacts on both patient and physician behavior.
Furthermore, product manufacturers, public health of-
ficials, and regulators should acknowledge patient and
physician fears as motivating factors for device removal
or discontinuation of a product. By recognizing the mo-
tivating role of fear, these stakeholders may determine
methods for providing objective product information
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and risk-benefit analyses specific to each patient. Physi-
cians must also acknowledge patient fear and psycho-
somatic symptoms when considering motivation for
removing medical devices in order to understand the
extent of a patient’s knowledge regarding the product’s
safety, provide medical advice, and also inform the pa-
tient regarding the risks and benefits of removal proce-
dures. Likewise, product manufacturers must not
underestimate the role that physician concerns play in
attending to and reacting to patient fear, or the role
that litigation plays in controlling a physician’s decision
to recommend alternative devices. When possible, re-
searchers should control for patient and physician fear
in future epidemiology studies when determining rea-
sons for implant removal or choice of product.
The negative impressions generating the halo effect
in each case often were not empirically derived, and
therefore were resistant to newly discovered informa-
tion and facts. This negative halo effect relating to
stigma is most prominent in the U.S. as a result of its
adversarial legal system [43]. Indeed, the environment
in which science cannot play a role in changing beliefs
and attitudes attracts litigation because non-scientific
grounds (e.g., company negligence or fraud claims) are
associated with higher financial stakes. Litigation and
regulatory decisions in the U.S. have clearly played sub-
stantial roles in generating stigma that ultimately af-
fects use patterns of entire categories of beneficial
drugs and medical devices, with potential lasting im-
pacts on public health and policy. Going forward, pub-
lic health stakeholders and policy makers must consider
that reported increases in device failure and explant-
ation following specific device recalls or withdrawals
may be driven mostly by patient fears rather than by
clinically important adverse effects.
Historical cases indicate that withdrawal events can
affect the use patterns of similar, but safe products be-
cause of both consumer and physician concerns of safety
or litigation risk. Product manufacturers must anticipate
this outcome and have a communication framework in
place to minimize non-evidence based rejection of their
product. They must understand product usage and re-
moval rates, as well as understand comparisons to simi-
lar or dissimilar products in the same category. Accurate
tracking of patient use, removal, and physician prescrip-
tion can help indicate early patterns of decline associated
with other product withdrawals or recalls.
In the case of Tysabri, a risk factor model was devel-
oped and was able to provide information for physicians
and patients regarding product prescription; however,
patient fear and stigma still played a major role in pa-
tient choices. Thus, product manufacturers must under-
stand how consumers receive information regarding
their products. In the case of the IUD, only half of
women received information from physicians, and the
other half sought information from popular press,
friends, or family [34]. We caution that researchers
should consider the sources of information feeding
overgeneralizations when assessing the medical impli-
cations of higher revision rates following product re-
calls and withdrawals. Consideration of recall-related
stigma should be understood by patients and surgeons
alike so that clinically objective risks are not overstated,
and so that the risk versus benefit decisions of pharma-
ceutical discontinuation or medical device removal are
based on objective scientific data and are not skewed
by unwarranted anxiety.
Differences in cultural factors between the U.S. and
European countries may be expected to influence the
halo and spillover effects described in our four cases,
although such factors can only be assessed qualita-
tively. Differences between U.K. and U.S. systems of
medical care and medical insurance are one example,
where the infrastructure of the U.K. national health-
care system can be expected to simplify and stream-
line certain choices (e.g., approved drugs or devices)
that in the U.S. are subject to influences from more
diverse stakeholders (e.g., drug or device manufac-
turers, private insurance companies, medical organiza-
tions, etc.). The legal system differences are another
potentially important difference, where medical and
scientific experts in the U.K. system are advisors to
the Court while the U.S. system is advocacy-based
and injects the ‘battle of experts’ into legal decision
making. Also, sensational journalism targeting alleged
misdeeds or inadequacies of regulatory officials, cor-
porate entities, physicians, testifying experts, and even
judges is more rampant in the U.S. when compared to the
U.K. These advocacy-based cultural factors in the U.S.
may promote greater distrust of medical and scientific au-
thorities by patients and citizens generally, and undoubt-
edly affects the nature, volume, and outcomes of U.S.
personal injury litigation compared to the U.K.
Finally, it is important that this paper not be seen to
be supporting flawed risk perception as a cudgel for
blaming the victim [113]. By highlighting kinds of over-
generalizations, such as halo and spillover effects, we
hope to leverage greater investment by regulators and
manufacturers in risk communication. Ultimately, we
believe that improvements in the messages to physi-
cians and the general public surrounding recalls and
withdrawals could help to prevent or mitigate the kinds
of faulty reasoning which may lead to unintended and
negative health care decisions.
Conclusions
Since this research was completed, additional examples
have come to light, the New York Times recently
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reported that litigation and fear of medication side ef-
fects may have influenced physician and patient behav-
ior resulting in otherwise avoidable osteopathic
fractures [114]. We have proposed a mechanism to ex-
plain these phenomena and a possible approach to
counteract the effects. In sum, we conclude that the
‘negative halo effect’ associated with a stigma – rather
than an objective risk-benefit assessment of medical
products – can increase negative health outcomes for
patients due to reduced or inappropriate product usage.
The four examples examined in detail here provide a
historical perspective spanning from the 1960s to
present and were selected in part based on the scientific
and social controversies raised by the influence of
equivocal scientific evidence, regulatory actions, prod-
uct recalls, and/or related litigation. For all drugs and
medical devices, it is crucial for manufacturers and the
medical community to have adequate aftermarket sur-
veillance mechanisms in place and to promptly and
rigorously evaluate adverse outcomes. The risk-benefit
considerations must be clearly and transparently com-
municated to patients and physicians, including the as-
sociated strengths weaknesses and uncertainties of the
scientific findings. Unwarranted negative halo effects
and spillover of stigma in the absence of reasonably
rigorous scientific proof can sometimes lead to serious
negative consequences in terms of treatment choices
and quality of life for patients in greatest need.
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